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I. Introduction
Greenhouse gas-induced climate change is an almost unanimously recognized
global threat.1 Accordingly, producing more energy from emission-free renewable
resources is a common goal for nations focused on minimizing climate change and
its effects.2 As the world continues to shift from fossil fuels to renewable fuels,
national and local policymakers are looking for ways to encourage the transition.3
Obligations under multilateral agreements, such as those under World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements, present constraints that these policymakers must
consider.4
Renewable energy policies have already attracted sanctions for violating rules
set out by WTO agreements. The challenges largely rest on violations of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and the Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement).5 The principles embodied in these
agreements, and their application to previous WTO Member actions, provide insight
for policymakers to consider when constructing policies aimed at renewable energy
development. That insight is the focus of this Article.
Section II of this Article outlines the anti-discrimination and anti-favoritism
principles contained in the GATT, SCM Agreement, and TRIMs Agreement as well
as potential defenses under Article XX of the GATT. Section III explains how the
rules under these agreements have been applied in previous challenges to renewable
energy programs and considers the viability of the GATT Article XX exceptions to

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, at v
(Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/; See also U.S. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. ET AL, JOINT
SCIENCE ACADEMIES STATEMENT, GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2005), http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf.
Renewable Energy Standards—Mitigating Global Warming, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/renewable-energy.html#.VU0yJ_lViko (last visited April 30, 2015); EUR. RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL,
RENEWABLE ENERGY: THE SOLUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 9, 13 (2010), http://www.seai.ie/Publications/Renewables_Publications_/Energy_RD_D/RESolutiontoclimatechange.pdf.
Charles Kenny, If Everyone Gets Electricity, Can the Planet Survive?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/energy-access-sdgs-un-climatechange/407734/; Coral Davenport & Gardiner Harris, Citing Urgency, World Leaders Converge on
France for Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/world/europe/obama-climate-conference-cop21.html?_r=0; Chris Mooney, Clean Energy Growth is “Off Track”
to Avert Climate Change, says Energy Agency, WASH. POST: ENERGY & ENV’T. (Oct. 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/10/02/why-the-world-couldbe-shifting-to-clean-energy-a-lot-faster/.
See infra Sections II and III of this Article for discussions of the important rules under the WTO
agreements.
See infra Section III for a discussion of specific disputes that raise complaints under the GATT, the
SCM Agreement, and the TRIMs Agreement.
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future programs. Finally, Section III discusses the lessons learned from analysis of
the agreements and prior disputes in the context of future policymaking decisions.
Though Member nations could institute any number of WTO-compliant renewable
energy policies, this Article discusses nationality-neutral measures for renewable
development, stimulus for renewable energy component manufacturers, subsidies
and benefits for service providers, and reductions in fossil fuel subsidies.

II. World Trade Organization Rules
The World Trade Organization (WTO), agreed upon by 123 signatory countries
on April 15, 1994, took effect on January 1, 1995.6 The WTO establishes rules to
facilitate open international markets and provides arenas for negotiating trade
agreements and resolving disputes between Members of those agreements.7
Conflicts that arise under a WTO agreement can be settled privately between
Member nations or through WTO consultations, and, if settlement negotiations fail,
a WTO Panel might hear the matter.8 If the WTO determines that a Member has
violated one or more of its agreements, it can demand compliance, institute
countervailing duties, or allow the challenging Member party to inflict its own
sanctions.9
The WTO took the place of multiple separate agreements negotiated since the
1947 GATT.10 The GATT persists as amended in 1994 and is joined by over thirty
international agreements and over six hundred regional agreements that lay out the
rules of trade for Members nations.11 Although many agreements under the WTO
and other intergovernmental organizations affect renewable energy markets, not all

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

U.N. INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIV., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, at 18, U.N. (2015), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.
The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) [hereinafter The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24 FORD. INT'L L. J 444, 468, (2000); Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, arts. 4, 5, Apr. 15, 1994,
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding] (appeals from Panel decisions can be heard by the
WTO Appellate Body).
Id. arts. 21, 22.
See The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 7.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT]. The 1947 agreement is still in effect, subject to the 1994 amendments. General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994); The WTO In
Brief Part 3: The WTO Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm (last visited on Sept. 1, 2015).
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can be discussed in this article.12 The GATT, the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM
Agreement13 impose constraints that are especially relevant to renewable energy
markets. These agreements are discussed in turn.
A. GATT
The GATT applies to “production and exchange of goods” among Members, as is
distinguishable from trade in services, which is covered by the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS).14 Its purpose is to facilitate a “substantial reduction
of tariffs and other trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal
and mutually advantageous basis.”15 Within the GATT, Articles I, III, and XX are
most important to a contemporary understanding of energy markets in the WTO.
Article I imposes a “most-favoured nation” requirement on Members, Article III
prohibits discrimination against imports, and Article XX includes important
exceptions.
1. Principles of non-discrimination
Article I of the GATT imposes a requirement that each Member treat all other
Members alike.16 Members must treat all other Members as a “most-favoured
nation,” so any trade concessions or benefits allowed to one Member must
unconditionally apply to all others.17 Article III requires Member states to treat
imports from other member nations similarly to all “like” domestic goods.18 This
“national” treatment command applies to all internal regulations, taxes, and any

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
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For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade Related Intellectual
Property (TRIPs), and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) might apply to disputes over
renewable energy programs. See Joanna I. Lewis, The Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism:
Emerging Trade Conflicts and Implications for Low Carbon Development, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL.
10, 12 (2014) (discussing the TRIPs and GPA). However, these agreements include similar constraints as those discussed in the GATT, SCM Agreement, and TRIMs Agreement, and would not
likely change the outcome of the scenarios discussed in this article.
GATT, supra note 11; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM].
GATT, supra note 11, Preamble.
Id.
GATT, supra note 11, art. I.
Id. This “most-favoured nation” treatment has been included in international treaties, including
GATT, for decades before 1994 amendment adopted it. See Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment Principle, MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUSTRY, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/gCT0212e.pdf (last visited Feb 26. 2016).
GATT, supra note 11, art. III(4). Any advantage or benefit available to domestic goods must also be
afforded to imports. Some exceptions are available for developing countries under certain conditions.
Id. art. I(2).
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measures that affect the prices of imports or exports.19 These measures cannot be
used as substitutes for tariffs by discriminating against imported goods.20 The
TRIMs agreement incorporates GATT Article III’s “national” treatment standard,
as is addressed further in Section II below.
These principles of non-discrimination and non-favoritism drive many
challenges to state action in the WTO. However, the GATT does offer multiple
exceptions, most of which are found in Article XX.
2. Article XX Exceptions
GATT Article XX includes multiple narrow exceptions that provide immunity
from all of the GATT’s constraints.21 Exceptions available for policies aimed at
protecting natural resources and/or human health, under Articles XX(b) and XX(g),
may be especially important for renewable energy development efforts.22 However,
measures taken in reliance on one of these exceptions must be narrowly drawn. All
of the Article XX exceptions must satisfy Article XX’s introductory paragraph, or its
“chapeau”— the government action must not amount to a “means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.”23
a) XX(b) exception for protecting human, animal,
and plant health
Article XX(b) of the GATT exempts Members from the agreement’s rules for
policies that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”24 This
exception might apply to certain climate change mitigation measures, as climate
change poses huge potential risks to human, animal, and plant life.25 However,

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id., art. III(4).
Id.
Id., art. XX.
Id., arts. XX(g), XX(b).
Id., art. XX.
Id., art. XX(b).
See Climate Change Threats and Impacts, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/global-warming-climate-change/threats-impacts/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015)
(“With rapid climate change, one-fourth of Earth’s species could be headed for extinction by 2050.”;
see Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/; see The Consequences of Climate
Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN.: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last updated Jan. 26, 2016).
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measures taken to this end must be “necessary” to prevent the risk.26
To determine whether a risk to human, animal, or plant life exists, a WTO panel
can consider evidence from scientific reports or expert testimony.27 In the dispute of
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products (EC–Asbestos), the WTO Appellate Body reviewed a lower Panel’s
application of GATT Article XX(b) to France’s trade embargos on asbestos
products.28 The Panel determined that asbestos posed a risk to human health based
on evidence gathered from expert testimony and reports indicating such a risk, but
did not quantify the degree of the risk.29 The Appellate Body noted that “after the
European Communities had established a prima facie case for the existence of a
health risk in connection with the use of chrysotile, Canada [the challenger] bore the
burden of refuting that case by showing the absence of such a health risk.”30
State action is only “necessary,” for purposes of Article XX(b), if no “alternative
measures either consistent or less inconsistent” with the GATT are
available.31 Notably, a Member must show more than a mere administrative burden
to establish that an alternative is unavailable.32 The WTO Appellate Body in EC–
Asbestos held that “‘[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or values’
pursued [are], the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures designed to
achieve those ends.”33
b) XX(g) exception
resources

for

conserving

natural

GATT Article XX(g) provides an exception for policies “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if such measures are made in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”34 A WTO
Member seeking to invoke Article XX(g) must demonstrate: (1) that it aims to

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Report of the Panel, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.20,
WT/DS2/R, (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.–Gasoline], available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/2-9.pdf.
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 163–66, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC–Asbestos], available
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf.
See id.
Id., ¶ 162.
Id., ¶ 27.
U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 26, at 16.
See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
art. 31, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Report], available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/2-9.pdf,
EC–Asbestos, supra note 27, ¶ 172.
GATT, supra note 11, art. XX(g).
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conserve exhaustible natural resources; (2) its policy must “relate” to such
conservation; and (3) any restrictions on international trade must be made “in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”35
Clean air is one example of an exhaustible natural resource.36 In the United
States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (U.S.–Gasoline)
dispute, a WTO Panel held that United States Environmental Protection Agency’s
Clean Air Act regulations that targeted gasoline ozone emissions were protected
under the GATT Article XX (g) exception.37 The Panel specifically held that clean
air constitutes an exhaustible natural resource, so “a policy to reduce the depletion
of clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article
XX (g).”38
GATT-exempted measures under Article XX(g) must “relat[e] to” their goal of
conservation.39 Moreover, the WTO Appellate Body holds that the state action must
be “primarily aimed at” conservation, and the implementation must be “reasonably
related to the ends.”40 To establish that a measure is “primarily aimed at”
conservation and “reasonably related to” its ends, a Member must show a close
“relationship between the general structure and design of the measure” and the
policy goal of conservation.41
Lastly, a policy must apply equally to foreign and domestic products. Article XX(g)
requires “even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of
conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural
resources.”42 Programs that explicitly treat domestic and foreign producers

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

41.
42.

Id.; U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 26, ¶ 6.35.
Id., ¶ 6.37.
Id.
Id. (agreeing with the U.S. argument that certain pollutants could deplete air quality over time); The
Appellate Body reversed the Panel decision on separate grounds. See U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 32, at 29. The complainants did not appeal the finding of clean air as an exhaustible
natural resource, so Appellate Body did not address the Panel’s decision regarding this issue. See id.
at 14–19.
GATT, supra note 11, art. XX(g).
U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 26, ¶ 6.39; see also Report of the Panel, Canada–Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.4, L/6268 (Nov. 20, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.)
at 98 (1988) [hereinafter Canada–Herring and Salmon], available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/87hersal.pdf; see also Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 141, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.–
Shrimp-Turtle],
available
at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds58/ab/r*
%20not%20rw*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# (holding that endangered sea turtles are an exhaustible natural resource).
U.S.–Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 40, ¶ 137.
See U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 32, at 21; U.S.–Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 40, ¶ 143.
The Panels in U.S.–Gasoline and U.S.–Shrimp found that, because the Member regulations applied
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differently are not “even-handed.”43 This requirement works in tangent to Article
III’s national treatment standard, so Members may find difficulty in citing the
Article XX(g) as an exception to clear Article III infractions.
c) Chapeau
Apart from the requirements under each specific GATT Article XX exemption, the
chapeau to Article XX negates any applicable exemptions if the policy in question
“constitute[s] a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade.”44 The chapeau was included to prevent “abuse of the exceptions.”45
There is little guidance for applying the chapeau’s standard. On one extreme, any
explicit ban or overtly discriminatory limitation on some markets over others will
fail under the chapeau, if it does not already fail under Article XX(g)’s “evenhandedness” requirement.46 Moreover, a Member invoking an Article XX exception
must do more than show that its policy serves some “justifiable purpose”; it must
also demonstrate that the measure is equally or less burdensome than other
approaches to serving that justifiable purpose.47
If a trade incentive or sanction includes any qualifications that result in
discriminatory effect—even incidentally—on the geographic origin of goods, that
trade incentive might not qualify for the Article XX exceptions either.48 In United
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (U.S.–Shrimp
Turtle), the United States required permits for importers of tuna, and only granted
permits to those who used United States-approved turtle protecting devices.49
Importers who used “comparably effective” protections were meanwhile excluded.50
Although endangered turtles were considered an exhaustible natural resource
under Article XX(g), the WTO Panel found that the equipment requirement was
both discriminatory and unjustified and thus violated the chapeau.51 Although U.S

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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to both domestic and foreign producers, they were even-handed. See U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Report,
supra note 32, at 21; U.S.–Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 40, ¶ 27.
U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 32, at 20–21.
GATT, supra note 11, Article XX
WORLD TRADE ORG., ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT, available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art20_e.pdf (last visited October 18, 2015).
See supra section above for discussion of Article XX(g). Such a discriminatory practice would also
run afoul of the SCM agreement, discussed in the next section.
Id. In this sense, it is akin to the “necessary” requirement under Article XX(b). See supra, Section
II.A.2.a.
U.S.–Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 40, ¶ 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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–Shrimp Turtle prohibited the United States shrimp embargo under Article XX’s
chapeau, some experts note that the report is a “landmark decision” that indicates a
“departure from past decisions in tone and reasoning.”52 Because the Panel’s
reasoning allows for some narrowly tailored measures aimed at protecting health
and natural resources, it “signals a positive trend in international trade law for using
unilateral trade bans to protect the environment.”53
The GATT’s Article XX exceptions negate Members’ violations of both the GATT
and the TRIMs Agreement.54 However, Article XX does not likely apply to the SCM
Agreement, which applies to product subsidies specifically.55
B. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The SCM Agreement prohibits or allows sanctions for certain government
subsidies.56 “Subsidies” under the SCM Agreement include financial contributions
or any measures that benefit exporting domestic goods or otherwise harm importing
foreign goods.57 Any “subsidy” under Article XVI of the GATT also is subject to the
SCM Agreement.58 If a Member limits access to subsidies for “certain industries or
enterprises” or a “designated geographic region,” the SCM Agreement deems it a
“specific subsidy,” and the subsidy is scrutinized further to determine whether it
complies with the agreement’s rules.59 “Specific” subsidies may be outright

52.

53.
54.
55.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We
Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999); Dukgeun Ahn,
Environmental Disputes in the GATT/WTO: Before and After U.S. Shrimp Case, 20 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 819, 822 (1999).
Brett Grosko, Note, Just When Is It That a Unilateral Trade Ban Satisfies the GATT?: The WTO
Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, 5 ENVTL. L. 817, 840-41 (1999).
See infra Section II.C. for a discussion of the TRIMs Agreement.
The SCM Agreement initially included an environmental exception, but the exception expired in
1999. Dispute Settlement, World Trade Organization: Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 17 (2003), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add15_en.pdf. Some argue that the GATT Article XX exceptions apply broadly to all agreements it overlaps with. See Paolo Davide Farah and Elena Cima,
The World Trade Organization, Renewable Energy Subsidies, and the Case of Feed-in Tariffs: Time
for Reform toward Sustainable Development, GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 534 (2015)
(discussing the arguments in favor of allowing GATT Article XX exceptions for violators of the SCM
Agreement). However, no Panel has ever ruled on such an extension of the GATT exceptions, and no
Member has ever asserted such an exception; the exceptions cannot be safely relied upon for subsidies. Id.
SCM, supra note 13, art. 1.1(a)(1).
Id. at 229. For example, tax credits, grants, loans, guarantees, foregone revenues, and price support
are explicitly included in the agreement.
Id. A subsidy exists if “there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of
GATT 1994.”
Id. art. 1.2. “A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall
be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the
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“prohibited” pursuant to Part II, or they may be “actionable” under Part III and
subject to countervailing measures.60
1. Prohibited Subsidies
Two types of specific subsidies are prohibited per se by the SCM Agreement: those
that require “the use of domestic products over imported goods” and those that are
granted based on “export performance,” whether explicitly by law or in effect.61 If
the WTO determines that a specific subsidy falls into either of these categories, the
subsidizing Member must cease the program. The United States, the European
Union, and Japan all challenged some of China’s renewable energy subsidies under
this provision in 2010.62 This settlement is discussed further in Section III below.
Subsidies that are not categorically prohibited warrant lesser restriction.
2. Actionable Subsidies
Subsidies are “actionable” under the SCM Agreement if they result in “adverse
effects to the interests of other Members.”63 Articles 5(a)-(c) provide that such
“adverse effects” exist if the subsidies cause “injury to the domestic industry of
another WTO Member,” the “nullification or impairment” of benefits accrued under
the GATT, or result in “serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.”64
Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement goes on to prompt investigating authorities to
consider, among other things, the following factors when determining “whether a
subsidy causes injury”: (i) the “nature” of and trade effects likely to result from the
subsidy; (ii) “a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic
market indicating the likelihood of substantially increased importation”; (iii) an

60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
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provisions of Article 2.” Part II concerns “prohibited subsidies,” Part III includes “actionable” subsidies,” and Part V discusses “countervailing measures” other Members can take against an infringing
Member.
Id. at 231-241.
Id.
Petition for Relief Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended: China’s Policies Affecting
Trade and Investment in Green Technology, (Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter China Petition], available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/09-09-2010%20Petition.pdf; Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, United States Requests WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations on China's Subsidies for Wind Power Equipment Manufacturers (Dec. 2010), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2010/december/united-states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con;
Request to Join Consultations by the European Union, China–Measures Concerning Wind Power
Equipment, WT/DS419/2 (Jan. 14, 2011); Request to Join Consultations by Japan, China–Measures
Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WT/DS419/3 (Jan. 19, 2011).
SCM, supra note 13, at 233.
Id.
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imminent, substantial increase in exports to complainant’s domestic market, “taking
into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional
exports”; (iv) “significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices” that
will increase demand for imported goods; and (v) inventories of the products being
investigated.65
Article 6.3 further specifies that a subsidy results in “serious prejudice” if it (a)
“displace[s] or impede[s] the exports of a like product of another Member into the
market of the subsidizing Member”; (b) “displaces or [impedes] the exports of a like
product of another Member from a third country market”; (c) results in “significant
price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price of a like
product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression,
price depression or lost sales in the same market”; or (d) increases the world market
share of the subsidizing Member’s product to a share that exceeds its average share
over the previous three years, provided that this increase in market share
temporally correlates to the period when subsidies have been granted.66 The SCM
Agreement states that “serious prejudice” does not exist when the trade imbalance
results from a natural disaster or emergency, or when there is a “voluntary decrease
in the availability for export of the product concerned from the complaining
Member.”67
Complaining Members can obtain varying degrees of remedial action if they
establish that another Member’s subsidy is “actionable”—that is, the subsidy either
“causes injury” or results in “serious prejudice” to other Members as outlined above.
After a WTO Panel or other “investigative body” finds a subsidy “actionable,” the
subsidizing Member must rectify the injurious effect, eliminate the entire subsidy
program if necessary, or else risk being subject to “countervailing measures.”68 For
example, in 2010 the United States International Trade Commission (ITC)
65.
66.
67.

68.

Id. at 248.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235. SCM Agreement, Article 6.7 in its entirety reads:
“Displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice shall not arise under paragraph 3
where any of the following circumstances exist during the relevant period: (a) prohibition or
restriction on exports of the like product from the complaining Member or on imports from the
complaining Member into the third country market concerned; (b) decision by an importing government operating a monopoly of trade or state trading in the product concerned to shift, for
non-commercial reasons, imports from the complaining Member to another country or countries;
(c) natural disasters, strikes, transport disruptions or other force majeure substantially affecting
production, qualities, quantities or prices of the product available for export from the complaining Member; (d) existence of arrangements limiting exports from the complaining Member; (e)
voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product concerned from the complaining
Member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms in the complaining Member have been
autonomously reallocating exports of this product to new markets); (f) failure to conform to
standards and other regulatory requirements in the importing country.”
Id. SCM part V outlines the process for imposing countervailing measures. Id. at 241-254.
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instituted tariffs against China’s solar producers pursuant to the SCM Agreement’s
“actionable subsidy” provisions.69 The WTO never heard this dispute, but the
settlement process is discussed below in Section III. The Agreement states that
countervailing measures must be terminated after five years unless the complaining
Member can establish that the measures must continue to avoid further injury or
“prejudice.”70
In concurrence with the GATT and the SCM Agreement, the TRIMs Agreement
also restricts Members’ influence over international markets and domestic
protectionism. While the SCM Agreement applies to “specific subsidies” and the
GATT regulates “trade barriers” generally, the TRIMs agreement prohibits
Members from imposing certain restrictions on private investments.71
C. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
The TRIMs Agreement prevents Member countries from conditioning foreign
direct investments (FDIs) and other financial resources, including technology
transfer requirements, on factors that favor domestic industry over the international
market.72 The Agreement reflects the principles set out in the GATT and provides
“an illustrative list of TRIMs, which are inconsistent with the obligation of national
treatment provided in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT and the obligation of
general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided in paragraph 1 of Article
XI of GATT 1994.”73
Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement references GATT Article III, and specifies that
TRIMs are subject to the GATT “national treatment” standard; both agreements
prohibit Members from requiring recipients of benefits to obtain input supplies from
domestic sources.74 The Annex to the TRIMs Agreement illustrates specific
scenarios that violate Article 2.75 For example, Members cannot require “the

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
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See infra Section III.A.1.
SCM, supra note 13, art. 21.3.
See infra Section II.C.
See Robert H. Edwards, Jr. & Simon N. Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169, 176–86 (1997)
(discussing historical treatment of foreign investments); Joanna I. Lewis, The Rise of Renewable Energy Protectionism: Emerging Trade Conflicts and Implications for Low Carbon Development, 14
GLOBAL
ENVTL.
POL.
1
(2014),
available
at
https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/jil9/files/2014/01/Lewis.RE_.Intl_.Trade_.Draft_.11.2013.pdf.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Results of the Ururgay
Round vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1244 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims_e.htm.
Id., art. 2.1; GATT, supra note 11, arts. III, XI.
TRIMs Agreement, supra note 73, Annex.
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purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic
source.”76 The TRIMs agreement also prohibits Members from requiring that
“enterprise[s’] purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related
to the volume or value of local products that it exports.”77 As provided by TRIMs
agreement Article 3, all of the GATT’s Article XX exceptions apply to the TRIMs
agreement.78 Exempted measures must satisfy Article XX’s chapeau under both
agreements.79
The rules laid out by these agreements set the stage for disputes over renewable
energy programs in the WTO. The following section briefly discusses some recent
renewable energy disputes, and then assesses the applicability of the GATT Articles
XX(b) and (g) exceptions.

III. Renewable Energy in the World Trade Organization
Some of the WTO constraints against trade discrimination, discussed in the
agreements above, have already been used to sanction renewable energy subsidies
and incentive programs. In designing renewable energy policies, nations must
consider these instances as well as how they might apply in the future.
A. Discrimination and Favoritism
Renewable energy subsidy programs instituted by the Canadian province of
Ontario and China demonstrate current trends in WTO dispute resolution. Other
challenges to clean energy policies follow similar patterns.
1. Ontario’s solar subsidies and local content
requirements
The Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009 (OGEA), enacted by the
Canadian province of Ontario, drew the first WTO challenge to a feed-in-tariff (FIT)
program for renewable energy.80 In 2011, both the European Union (EU) and Japan

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. TRIMs Agreement Article 2 also incorporates GATT Article XI, which prohibits quantitative restrictions on importers. Id., Article 2.
Id., Article 3.
See supra Section III.A.2. of this article for a discussion of Article XX exceptions and the chapeau’s
requirements.
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009 S.O. 2009, c. 12 (Can.) [hereinafter OGEA],
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/statutes/english/2009/elaws_src_s09012_e.htm.
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challenged the OGEA separately.81 The presiding WTO Panel merged the two
disputes to consider the identical issues under the GATT, the SCM Agreement, and
the TRIMs Agreement.82 Ultimately, Ontario was forced to remove the local content
requirements due to GATT and TRIMs violations.83
Ontario’s OGEA offered FITs for development, production, and use of renewable
energy in the province.84 The law also ensured electric generators access to
distribution, long term contracts, and a reasonable profit under state-subsidized
power purchase agreements.85 The FIT benefits were contingent upon purchasing
equipment and other inputs locally.86 The EU and Japan both challenged Ontario’s
FIT program as a violation of the GATT’s “most-favoured nation” and “national”
treatment provisions, the SCM Agreement’s “prohibited subsidy” provision, and the
TRIMs Agreement.87
The EU and Japan specifically argued that the OGEA’s FIT program was
inconsistent with the GATT’s obligations under Article III.88 The parties claimed
that the program affected “the internal sale, purchase or use of renewable energy
generation equipment and components, according less favourable treatment to like
products of European Union origin.” 89 The Panel agreed that the FIT program
conflicted with GATT Article III’s national treatment standard as well as Article 2
of the TRIMs agreement.90 Because the OGEA required renewable energy and
equipment producers to utilize a portion of “products of domestic origin” in order to
“obtain an advantage,” it violated GATT Article III’s “national treatment” standard
and was prohibited by both the GATT and the TRIMs agreement.91 Even if Article

81.

82.
83.
84.

85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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Request for Consultations by Japan, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/1 (Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Japan-Canada WTO Request]; Request for Consultations by the European Union, Canada – Measures Related to the FeedIn Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS426/1 (Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter EU-Canada WTO Request].
Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO
Doc. WT/DS412/R (Dec. 19, 2012); Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff
Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada–FIT Program].
Id.
OGEA, supra note 80, § 7(4). (“Feed-in tariff program” means a program for procurement, including
a procurement process, providing standard program rules, standard contracts and standard pricing
regarding classes of generation facilities differentiated by energy source or fuel type, generator capacity and the manner by which the generation facility is used, deployed, installed or located.).
Id.; Canada–FIT Program, supra, note 82.
OGEA, supra note 80, § 7(3). (“the Minister shall issue, and the OPA shall follow in preparing its
feed-in tariff program, directions that set out the goals relating to domestic content to be achieved
during the period to be covered by the program.”); Canada–FIT Program, supra note 82 (prior to
Europe and Japan’s challenges, domestic content requirements ranged from 25% to 60%).
Japan-Canada WTO Request, supra note 81; EU-Canada WTO Request, supra note 81.
Canada–FIT Program, supra note 82, ¶ 3.4(c).
Id. ¶ 3.4.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 7.115; TRIMs Agreement, supra note 73, Annex, ¶ 1(a).
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III of the GATT did not restrict Ontario’s use of the OGEA subsidies (it did), the
Panel noted that the program fell under the paragraph 1(a) example of the TRIMs
Agreement’s Annex.92 The TRIMs agreement would have thus been a sufficient basis
to rule against the OGEA renewable subsidy program.93
2. China’s
renewable
program
performance requirements

and

export

In 2010, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organization (AFL-CIO) challenged China’s renewable energy subsidy program for
violating the SCM Agreement.94 The USW filed a petition with the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) alleging that China’s “Ride the Wind” subsidy
program offered domestic wind and solar manufacturers financial benefits that were
contingent upon the manufacturers’ use of domestic suppliers and export
performance.95 To obtain benefits under the program, foreign producers were
required to work with local enterprises for renewable development and use local
Chinese suppliers.96 The petition alleged that these “discriminatory provisions”
were prohibited under Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement.97
The USTR concluded that China’s program violated the SCM Agreement, and the
United States commenced settlement dispute consultation in the WTO.98 Rather
than rely on a WTO Panel to rule on the dispute, the parties reached a settlement
during the WTO consultation proceedings, and China voluntarily removed some of

92.

93.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

TRIMs Agreement, supra note 73, Annex, ¶ 1(a) (a requirement for “the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or
value of its local production” constitutes a violation of TRIMs Agreement).
Canada–FIT Program, supra, note 82, ¶¶ 7.120–7.121 (even though violations of the TRIMs Agreement Annex usually constitute violations of the GATT Article III as well, the Panel noted that it
would be” inappropriate to infer from Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List that TRIMs having the
characteristics described in that paragraph will always be inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT
1994, irrespective of whether they may be covered by the terms of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994”).
China Petition, supra note 62.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 62–65.
SCM, supra note 13, at art. 1 and 3.
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Requests WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations on China's Subsidies for Wind Power Equipment Manufacturers (Dec. 2010),
available
at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2010/december/united-states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con (The UTSR’s finding said nothing about the
complaints under the GATT); Request to Join Consultations by the European Union, China–
Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/2 (Jan. 12, 2011); Request to
Join Consultations by Japan, China–Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment, WTO Doc.
WT/DS419/3 (Jan. 17, 2011).

557

14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 543 (2016)

its subsidy programs.99 However, China retained some subsidy programs for
domestic solar panel production. The United States has instituted steep “antidumping” tariffs against Chinese products receiving these subsidies to counter the
prejudicial effect, pursuant to the SCM Agreement’s “actionable” subsidies
provisions.100
Although there is little definitive guidance on whether China’s solar subsidy
programs was or is still in violation of the SCM Agreement, China’s voluntary
elimination of some of its subsidies at least demonstrates the effects of the WTO
rules on Member nation decision-making.101 The subsidies that China removed were
probably “prohibited” under Article 3 because they unambiguously included
financial benefits that were directly contingent on the use of domestic inputs. As
such, China did not bother arguing that it complied and simply removed the clear
SCM Agreement violations.102
As for China’s remaining subsidies, the United States ITC determined for itself
that the Chinese subsidies resulted in prejudice to the United States’ renewable
energy market.103 The United States acted pursuant to the “actionable” subsidies
provisions of the SCM Agreement and imposed tariffs on the Chinese products to
counteract the effect.104 Although China successfully challenged the validity of some
of the United States’ countervailing measures, they failed to establish that their
remaining subsidies were not specific and actionable.105 In the decisions regarding
China’s complaint against the United States’ sanctions, the Panel and WTO
Appellate Body merely urged the “United States [to] bring its measures into

99.

100.

101.
102.

103.
104.
105.
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Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, China Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute (June 2011), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-ends-wind-power-equipmentsubsidies-challenged.
See Diane Cardwell, U.S. Imposes Steep Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/business/energy-environment/-us-imposes-steep-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels.html; see also Keith Bradsher, China Criticizes Steep U.S. Tariffs on Solar Panels,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/business/energy-environment/china-criticizes-steep-us-tariffs-on-solar-panels.html.
See Press Release, China Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies, supra note 99.
Deepa Badrinarayana, Trading Up Kyoto: A Proposal to Amend the Protocol, Part 1, 41 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2014), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol41/iss1/2 (“The fact that China
agreed to withdraw the subsidy indicates that the United States’ prohibited subsidies claim might
have been tenable.”).
China Rejects U.S. Trade Ruling That Solar Imports Harm Industry, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 4,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-04/china-rejects-u-s-trade-panel-s-rulingthat-solar-imports-harm-industry.
See id.
Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, 13-14, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter U.S.–Countervailing
Measures], available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/437abr_e.pdf.
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conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.”106
1. European Union, India, and others domestic
content requirements
Multiple EU countries, including Greece and Italy, adopted renewable energy
feed-in tariff programs with domestic content requirements similar to Ontario’s
before Ontario’s program was challenged.107 In November 2012, China filed a
request for dispute consultation in the WTO, in which it challenged the FIT
programs under Articles I and III of the GATT, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement,
and Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.108 Japan requested to join the consultations
shortly after China filed its request.109 No agreement has yet been reached.110
India also sought to implement a subsidy program that contained similar
requirements to use local suppliers.111 On February 6, 2013, the United States filed
a request with the WTO for dispute consultations.112 Similar to the challenges
discussed so far in this section, the United States challenged India’s subsidies under
the same GATT, SCM Agreement, and TRIMs Agreement provisions.113 On
February 24, 2016, a WTO panel issued a report in which it found, among other
things, that India’s domestic content requirements “are not distinguishable in any
relevant respect from the domestic content requirements previously examined under
this provision [GATT Article III] by the Appellate Body in Canada--Renewable
Energy/Feed-In Tariff Program.”114
B. Applicability of the GATT Article XX Defenses
The language of the agreements, combined with the application of their rules to
Canadian, Chinese, Indian, and European subsidy programs, make clear that a
Members’ program for renewable energy products cannot directly favor domestic

106. Id. at 14.
107. Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States–Certain Measures
Concerning the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds452_e.htm.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Request for Consultations by the United States, India–Certain Measure Relating to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/1, (Feb. 24, 2016), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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industry.115 If a Member’s actions result in prejudice or injury to another Member’s
“like” market, it must cease its violating program or risk being sanctioned sans a
valid defense. Although no Member has successfully defended its renewable energy
measures, Members might succeed in the future using Article XX(b)—for measures
that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life”—and Article XX(g)—for
measures that relate to the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”116
1. Article XX(b)
The exception for policies that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
health or life” can likely apply to renewable energy measures intended to mitigate
climate change. These measures must be “necessary.”
To demonstrate a need to protect human, animal, or plant health, Members can
consider evidence of a risk to health or life provided by scientific experts and
reports.117 With respect to climate change, experts and reports galore support the
resounding worldwide scientific consensus that global warming poses a threat to the
health of humans and global ecosystems.118 The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), both supported by scientists from around the world,
recognize the dangers that greenhouse gas-induced climate change presents to
health and life in terms of increased disease, destruction of coastlines and property,
and deterioration of natural habitats, ecosystems, and agriculture.119 Because
energy generation results in sixty percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions,
actions taken to increase the supply of zero-emission energy resources will certainly
help to reduce the rate of greenhouse gas output and the associated impacts on
climate change.120 As long as a Member aims to mitigate greenhouse gas output and

115. See infra Sections II and III(A) for a discussion of the WTO rules and their application.
116. See, e.g., Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Cima, The World Trade Organization, Renewable Energy Subsidies, and the Case of Feed-in Tariffs: Time for Reform toward Sustainable Development, 27 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 533 (2015) (discussing GATT Articles XX(b) & (g)).
117. EC–Asbestos, supra note 27.
118. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Martin Parry et. al. eds., Climate
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 7–22 (2007) [hereinafter
Contribution
of
Working
Group
II],
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble (June 4, 1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC];
Joint Science Academies’ Statement: Global Response to Climate Change (2005), http://www.nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf.
119. See Contribution of Working Group II, supra note 117, at 7–22; UNFCCC, supra note 117, Preamble.
120. See, e.g., Renewable Energy Standards—Mitigating Global Warming, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/re-
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climate change with its policy, it might qualify for an exception under Article XX(b)
provided that its implementation is “necessary” to accomplish such mitigation.121
Conditions for incentives in renewable energy markets that are tied to geographic
origin or export performance are probably not “necessary” under Article XX(b).
Challengers could easily point to “alternative measures” that are “either consistent
or less inconsistent” with the GATT—specifically those that do not discriminate
against foreign entities or unreasonably favor domestic industry.122 Although
mitigating climate change is a possibly “vital” common interest, and measures taken
in its pursuit should perhaps be given more leeway, Members can encourage
renewable energy development without negatively impacting international trade.123
2. Article XX(g)
Clean energy policies can probably qualify for an exception under Article XX(g)
for reducing GHG emissions, similar to how the Clean Air Act regulations in U.S.–
Gasoline were exempted because they reduced ozone emissions.124 Renewable
energy policies, like the regulations in U.S.–Gasoline, aim to conserve air quality, an
“exhaustible natural resources.”125 Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations
damage the atmosphere’s suitability for stable ecosystems.126 Air quality and many
of Earth’s natural resources are threatened by unreasonably high greenhouse gas
levels.127 As long as a Member’s renewable energy development measure is

121.
122.
123.

124.

125.
126.
127.

newable-energy.html#.VU0yJ_lViko (last visited April 30, 2015); see also Nancy Pfund & Ben Healey, Should the Government Subsidize Alternative Energy?, YALE SCHOOL OF MGMT. (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/should-government-subsidize-alternative-energy.
See, e.g., Clean Energy Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY SOLS.,
http://www.c2es.org/federal/policy-solutions/clean-energy-standards (last visited April 20, 2015); see
also Pfund & Healey, supra note 119.
U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 26, ¶ 6.20.
EC–Asbestos, supra note 27, ¶¶ 169, 172 (holding that “[t]he more vital or important [the] common
interests or values’ pursued [are], the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ measures designed
to achieve those ends”). The Panel in Canada–FIT did not rule on the necessity of an Article XX(b)
exception, but did hold that the primary goal of Ontario’s local content requirement served the primary goal of market capture and protection of domestic industry. See, e.g., Canada–FIT Program,
supra note 82, at ¶¶ 7.7, 8.5, 8.9; See, e.g., Memorandum from the Minister of Energy to Colin Andersen, Chief Exec. Officer, Ontario Power Authority (Aug. 16, 2013), available at http://powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/page/DirectionAdministrativeMatters-renewables-Aug16-2013.pdf
(Ontario continues its Tariff program with a drastic cutback of its domestic use conditions).
U.S.–Gasoline, supra note 31; see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 7, 18 –20 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2012)
[hereinafter RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION] (discussing the climate change mitigation aspects of clean energy and the resulting GHG emissions).
Id.
See RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION, supra note 124.
See U.S.–Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 40, ¶¶ 132–134 (holding that sea turtles, living organisms, are
natural resources).
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“primarily aimed” at conserving a natural resource (whether it is air quality,
humans, animals, and/or ecosystems), “reasonably related to” the aim, and with
“even handed” incentives, those measures will probably fall within the subject
matter of the GATT Article XX(g) exception.128
A Member who seeks an exception under GATT Article XX must not only fall
under the subject matter of one of the enumerated exceptions, but also must show
that its policy does not “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade” under the Article XX chapeau.129 If trade
measures include conditions such as export performance or local content quotas,
induce trade restriction, or incidentally amount to discrimination against foreign
Members, they will not be protected by Article XX’s exceptions for violations of either
the GATT or TRIMs agreement. Renewable energy programs that violate the GATT
or TRIMs Agreement might be exempt under Articles XX(b) and (g) if they do not
prejudice other Members’ markets. If the program also amounts to a “specific”
subsidy under the SCM Agreement, and is either “prohibited” or “actionable,” the
program’s Member will likely have no defense.130
The foregoing disputes and analysis are used in the next section to discuss ways
that Member governments can avoid clashing with WTO constraints when
constructing renewable energy policies.

IV. Avoiding Disputes: Renewable Energy Development for WTO
Member Nations
Clearly, the WTO rules discussed so far in this article do not allow policies that
discriminate against non-domestic markets on their face. Measures that impact the
international market less overtly might survive under the rules, provided that they
do not injure or cause “prejudice” to other Members, or do not unjustifiably
discriminate or serve as “disguised restriction[s] on international trade.”131 Member
governments must consider these rules and their application when constructing
policies of any sort. The following discussion could be applied to policymaking
generally, but it is intended to cater to some unique features of the renewable energy
market. Measures actively aimed at avoiding discrimination that also incentivize
manufacturers and support fossil fuel service industries will realize the most success

128. Id. at ¶ 141; U.S.–Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 32, at 20–21.
129. GATT, supra note 11, art. XX.
130. See supra note 55 for a discussion of the GATT Article XX’s applicability, or, more likely, non-applicability, to the SCM Agreement.
131. See supra Sections II and III above discussing rules under the GATT, SCM, and TRIMs Agreements.
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in terms of both increasing renewable energy generation and avoiding WTO
disputes.
A. Measures that do not Discriminate
Member governments can craft renewable energy policies that incentivize
renewable energy production generally, with absolutely no discrimination against
foreign markets in phrasing, intention, or effect. Obviously, policymakers should
keep in mind the potential downstream consequences of conditions they place on any
incentives, benefits, regulations, taxes, or subsidies to ensure neutrality. The
“national” and “most-favoured nation” treatment principles discussed in Sections II
and II should always guide decision-making. Unintended effects in foreign markets
might subject specific subsidies to sanctions under the SCM or another agreement,
so Members should take care to avoid incidental market impacts and consider
contingency plans to assuage the concerns of other Members. Renewable energy is
a relatively young industry, so market shifts in one country can often affect prices
globally.132 As such, renewable energy policy development should always include an
analysis of any potential “injury” or “prejudice” to the international market in order
to prevent WTO violations.
If climate change mitigation was the only goal, it would not matter from whom
developers purchase their supplies. However, governments often favor domestic
industries with subsidies or regulatory favoritism in order to bolster economic
stability, create jobs, protect “infant industries,” and prompt market shifts.133
Domestic content requirements, a tool used for many industries, are one type of
favoritism that can be substituted with more straightforward measures aimed
directly at renewable energy manufacturers.134
B. Measures Focused on Manufacturing
As noted above, requiring the use of domestic manufacturers helps grow and fuel
a nation’s own economy. Due to of these benefits, governments are less likely to

132. Michaela D. Platzer, U.S. Solar Photovoltaic Manufacturing: Industry Trends, Global Competition,
Federal
Support,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE
1–5
(Jan.
27,
2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42509.pdf.
133. Sherry M. Stephenson, Addressing Local Content Requirements: Current Challenges and Future Opportunities, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., (July 25, 2013),
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/addressing-local-content-requirements-current-challenges-and-future (governments are less likely to subsidize industries that rely on foreign manufactured technology).
134. Id.
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subsidize industries that rely on foreign manufactured technology.135 However,
these benefits still might be realized by directly shifting aid from developers to the
supporting suppliers, with the added benefit of avoiding the high risk of sanctions
under WTO rules.
By providing incentives to the manufacturers of renewable energy components,
rather than the manufacturing facilities that put everything together, Member
governments can increase domestic component supply. This would serve to increase
local availability and likely decrease the costs for developers downstream.136 As the
renewable energy market matures and supplies become more widely available in
domestic markets, developers might rely on domestic content on their own accord.
Until such maturation occurs, governments can help local manufacturers achieve
competitive status in the global market. For example, governments can provide
subsidies, low interest loans, low cost land grants, streamlined permitting, or
reductions in regulatory duties to encourage new participants to enter the market
or to help current market participants expand to reach economies of scale and
further decrease downstream prices.137
Of course, policymakers must avoid over-incentivizing manufacturers so as to
artificially deflate component prices to the extent that foreign competition will be
prejudiced. For example, China’s solar and wind manufacturing subsidies are
probably “actionable” under the SCM Agreement because of such price deflation.138
Even if a program is narrowly drawn enough to qualify for an Article XX exception
that would otherwise violate the GATT or TRIMs Agreement, an action that would
qualify as a “specific subsidy” under the SCM agreement will likely be removed from
such an exception.139 Other Members might be able to impose “countervailing”
sanctions commensurate with any level of incidental “prejudice” to other markets.140
C. Measures Aimed at Services
Member nations might help develop their domestic or local renewable energy
135. See id.
136. See China Petition, supra note 62 and accompanying text for an example of manufacturing subsidies
driving component prices down.
137. Richard J. Campbell, China and the United States–A Comparison of Green Energy Programs and
Policies, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7 (April 30, 2014), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41748.pdf (China offers subsidized interest rates and tax benefits
for renewable energy projects to boost the industry).
138. Id.
139. See supra note 55.
140. See China Petition, supra note 62. Although some of China’s renewable subsidies are probably “actionable” under the SCM, the United States’ countervailing duties were inordinately strict given the
level of injury resulting from the subsidies, as was determined by the WTO Panel. U.S.–Countervailing Measures, supra note 105.
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industry by granting benefits to renewable energy service providers. Discriminating
against foreign companies that provide services domestically would still violate the
“national treatment” and “most-favoured nation” treatment standards under the
GATS.141 However, discrimination and domestic favoritism in service industries do
not carry the same benefits as they do in product markets. Service providers that
support domestic renewable energy industries are often domestic entities too—even
if not, providing benefits to all service providers who act within a Member’s borders
will still benefit the domestic economy and often provide employment to domestic
residents.142 Subsidizing or providing other advantages to service providers would
help decrease the input costs of renewable energy development and accelerate
growth of the domestic industry.
D. Measures Aimed at the Competing Market
Although renewable industries—particularly the wind and solar industries—are
expanding rapidly, the fossil energy industry is still enormous in comparison.143
Some stakeholders have called for global changes in energy subsidization, but
national and sub-national governments can still do their part to accelerate the shift
to renewable fuels.144 The International Energy Agency calculated that the global
renewable energy market in 2013 received less than one-fourth of the nearly $550
billion in subsidies the fossil fuel industry’s received the same year.145 Governments
could close this gap in state support by eliminating fossil fuel subsidies rather than
creating new subsidies for renewables.
As fossil fuel prices continue to drop—and even if they do not continue—a shift in
priority for subsidies is necessary for short-term renewable energy growth to levels

141. GATT, supra note 11, arts. XVII, II.
142. Brian Bandell, Foreign Companies Spur South Florida Job Growth, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Jun. 20, 2014),
http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/blog/morning-edition/2014/06/foreign-companies-spursouth-florida-job-growth.html; Matthew J. Slaughter, How U.S. Multinational Companies
Strengthen the U.S. Economy, U.S. COUNCIL FOUND. (2009), available at http://www.uscib.org/docs/foundation_multinationals.pdf; Gross Domestic Product as a Measure of U.S. Production, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUS. 8 (Aug. 1991), http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/national/nipa/1991/0891od.pdf, (products produced within U.S. borders contribute to GDP, services
support such production).
143. Why Fossil Fuel Divestment Won't be Easy, CARBON BRIEF (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.carbonbrief.org/why-fossil-fuel-divestment-wont-be-easy (fossil fuels supported a $4.65 trillion industry in
2014 compared to the $220 billion clean energy’s industry.)
144. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 18.
145. World Energy Outlook--Energy Subsidies, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2013), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/; Lauren Stanford, Fossil Fuel and Renewable Energy Subsidies, CLEAN ENERGY ACTION (2013), http://www.cleanenergyaction.org/2013/07/26/fossil-fuel-andrenewable-energy-subsidies/.
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needed to reach global climate change mitigation goals.146 Even though some
renewable energy costs are approaching parity with energy produced by fossil fuels,
Member governments who wish to increase renewable energy production would do
well to minimize the governmental benefits that flow to the renewable industry’s
competitor, fossil fuels.147 Policymakers might realize some or all of their market
shifting goals simply by eliminating existing subsidies and government stimulation
for the fossil fuel industry.148 Rather than draw scrutiny to new renewable energy
policies that might conflict with WTO rules, Member governments might avoid the
issue altogether and focus on obtaining a relative market advantage for renewable
energy and its supporting industries.

V. Conclusion
Increased renewable energy generation is a primary goal for those interested in
mitigating the risks posed by climate change. Recent challenges in the WTO show
that not all renewable energy policies will be subject to scrutiny. Policymakers who
aim to instigate renewable energy development must learn from the WTO’s
application of its rules. Policies that aim for neutrality, support for manufacturers,
subsidies for service providers, and decrease in fossil fuel subsidies will likely evade
scrutiny in the WTO and achieve their goal of encouraging renewable energy
development.

146. Julia Mitusova, Oil Prices: The Winners, the Losers, and Geopolitical Drivers of Change, PULSE (Oct.
19, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/oil-prices-winners-losers-geopolitical-drivers-change-mitusova-mba?trk=hp-feed-article-title-like; Thomas Day, et al., What the Paris Agreement Means for
Global Climate Change Mitigation, NEW CLIMATE INSTITUTE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.newclimate.org/2015/12/14/what-the-paris-agreement-means-for-global-climate-change-mitigation/ (discussing the goal of keeping global warming to two degrees Celsius or below, and the most recent
international convention on reaching that goal).
147. Solar Power to Reach Price Parity with Fossil Fuels by 2016, Says Deutsche Bank, PLANET EXPERTS
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.planetexperts.com/solar-power-reach-price-parity-fossil-fuels-2016-saysdeutsche-bank/.
148. Laura Merrill, Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies Still on the Agenda–the International Community
Must now Walk the Talk, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 20, 2015),
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/Eliminating_Fossil_Fuel_Subsidies_Still_on_the_Agenda; Shelagh Whitley,
Time to Change the Game: Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Climate, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INST. (2013),
available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8668.pdf.
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